



RE-INTEGRATION, REHABILITATION AND RE-CONSTRUCTION IN POST NIGERIA-BIAFRA WAR IN SOUTH EAST NIGERIA

Inyikalum, Daniel¹ & Onuoha, Peter Chuks^{2*}

¹ Department of Political Science, University of Port Harcourt

² Department of Political Science, Rivers State University

ARTICLE HISTORY

RECEIVED

27-06-2026

ACCEPTED

13-07-2026

PUBLISHED

16-07-2026

Corresponding author:

Onuoha, Peter Chuks

Department of Political Science,
Rivers State University



Abstract

This research examined the difficulties of reintegration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction following the Nigeria-Biafra conflict in South East Nigeria. Regrettably, the African continent has experienced numerous violent conflicts, resulting in significant repercussions such as political, social, economic, and humanitarian issues. The Nigerian civil conflict, commonly referred to as the Biafran War, occurred from July 6, 1967, to January 15, 1970, involving the Eastern Region of Nigeria against the remaining parts of the nation. The research is based on the Marxist Political-Economy Framework, aiming to explore the relationships among individuals and classes, and endeavors to comprehend the economy not as a flawless machine but as a dynamic system rife with contradictions and destined for replacement. This research utilized a political economy perspective to reveal the socio-economic and political marginalization of Nigerians during the civil war, resulting in poverty, unrest, and subsequently social issues like economic turmoil and political instability experienced in the nation from 1967 to 1970. Using a qualitative research method, the study found that the socio-political and economic landscape of Nigeria, particularly in the South East, was significantly impacted by the conflict, highlighting the necessity for a strong push towards authentic Re-integration, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction in post Nigeria-Biafra war South East Nigeria. Based on the above, the study suggests that immediate and efficient Re-integration, Rehabilitation, and Re-construction are necessary in the post Nigeria-Biafra conflict in South East Nigeria.

Key words: Reintegration, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, Nigeria-Biafra, War, South-East

Introduction

The African continent has experienced several violent conflicts that have resulted in severe outcomes, including political, social, economic, and humanitarian issues. The Nigerian civil conflict, commonly referred to as the Biafran War, occurred from 6 July 1967 to 15 January 1970 between the former Eastern Region of Nigeria and the remainder of the nation. The Eastern Region proclaimed itself an independent state, which the Federal Military Government of Nigeria viewed as a secessionist action. Since gaining independence in 1960, the nation was marked by a tenuous state of peace and stability, ultimately leading to the onset of war. Indeed, numerous conflicts that exist today have their origins in the occurrences during Nigeria's time of colonial governance. The outbreak of the Nigerian civil war stemmed from political, economic, ethnic, cultural, and religious tensions that existed before Britain officially decolonized the nation Devon (2022). The Federal Military Government of Nigeria stated that the war aimed to reunify the nation, while the Biafrans viewed it as a struggle for independence, representing the peak of a series of troubling events that started in January of 1966. The civil war presented the most significant threat to Nigeria's ongoing existence, unity, and territorial integrity (Nwabueze, 2015). The direct trigger of the civil war can be pinpointed to the coup and counter coup of 1966, which changed the political framework and dismantled the trust among the primary ethnic groups. To prevent the country from falling apart, it was split into twelve states from the initial four regions in May 1967.

The previous Eastern Region led by Lt. Col. Emeka Ojukwu (1933-2011) viewed the creation of states by decree "without consultation" as the final provocation and proclaimed the Region an independent state of "Biafra." The Federal Government in Lagos regarded this as an illegal act of secession. Numerous meetings were conducted in an attempt to settle the matter amicably but failed. To prevent the country's disintegration, the central government resolved to re-integrate the secessionist area into the nation by force. Nonetheless, although the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) effectively curtailed the secession effort, the conflict appears to have not addressed the significant problems that led to it (Bhagwati, 2020).

On January 15, 1966, the initial military coup d'état, orchestrated by Lt. Col. Ch.K.Nzeogwu and Ifeajuna, toppled the first Nigerian Republic, resulting in the deaths of 22 individuals, including Nigeria's Prime Minister at the time. The Nigerian civil war seems like a contradiction. On one side, the conflict reestablished Nigeria's political landscape that had been altered by the breaking away Eastern Region. Simultaneously, fatalities, damage to property, and fractured relationships among Nigerian ethnic groups, along with other effects of conflict, were quite frequent. It is based on the foregoing that this study interrogates the difficulties of reintegration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction following the Nigeria-Biafra conflict in South East Nigeria.

Statement of the problem

This research aims to explore the difficulties of re-integration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction in post Nigeria-Biafra war within South East Nigeria. Conflicts or wars are viewed as a catalyst for economic downturn, as they hinder both small and large scale enterprises. Democracy, due to its all-encompassing nature, is anticipated to mitigate the impact of the economic downturn caused by many current conflicts in Nigeria. Regrettably, the expectation for the improvement of Nigeria's economy in 2023 with the arrival of new leadership appears to have not materialized. Despite the successes claimed in combating corruption in various aspects, the onset of this economic downturn has shattered the prior hopes of

Nigerian citizens. In the pursuit of earning a living, individuals partake in both lawful and unlawful business-related connections, thereby aligning themselves with groups that are oriented towards conflict. They struggle to break free from the conflict trap given that they are on any illegal payroll (Obi-Ani 1998).

The Federal Military Government under General Yakubu Gowon enacted the post-civil war reconstruction program after the Nigerian Civil War to restore and repair damaged infrastructure and to reintegrate the Igbo into the Nigerian state's framework. Nigeria, the nation with the highest population on the African continent, is endowed with abundant human and natural resources. Crude oil and agriculture are primary revenue sources for the nation and vital for the livelihoods of its more than 200 million people (NBS, 2020). In spite of these natural resources, Nigeria is encountering an economic crisis. Prior to the 1970s, agriculture served as the backbone of the nation's economy, with foreign exchange generated from cash crops such as cotton, groundnut, cocoa, and palm oil being more favorable. However, the discovery of crude oil in significant amounts during that time led the government.

The breakdown of post-war reconciliation impacts the Igbo ethnic group in two aspects. The first issue is that it has produced "primary victims," the older generations of Igbo who experienced the conflict and whose clear recollections are entirely overlooked, and for whom what is now called reconciliation holds no significance. The additional category is the "secondary victims," individuals who have become victims due to the continuation of initial circumstances, as observed with the rise of neo-Biafran movements both within and beyond Nigeria. The Biafran experience clearly illustrates the lasting consequences of neglecting or rejecting personal or shared memories and their influence on the chances for reconciliation and reintegration. Given that individuals expected to be central to reconciliation are overlooked in these efforts, this implies that lasting peace, at least in the current circumstances, is very unlikely. Hence, the need to examine the challenges of reintegration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction following the Nigeria-Biafra conflict in South East Nigeria

Theoretical Framework

Political Economy Framework

The Marxist Political-Economy Framework aims to examine the relationships among individuals and classes, striving to comprehend the economy not as an ideal clockwork apparatus but as a dynamic system rife with contradictions and destined for replacement. Political economy focuses on both the creation and governance of a society's material resources, as well as their allocation among different groups or classes and the conflicts that result from these activities (Nmom, 2011). The political economy perspective generally considers the class arrangement of each specific society, along with exploitation and consequently social or class disputes. Karl Marx highlighted his materialist perspectives on property and means of production. He contended that what holds the highest value stems from human effort and based his beliefs in a capitalist society, implying that most wealth is possessed by a limited few.

This creates a separation between two categories: the industrialists and the labor class. The industrialists, those constituting the small fraction, possess the means of production. The working class comprises individuals who generate income by offering their labor for sale. Issues become apparent as the upper class aims to maximize output while minimizing expenses. A surplus value is generated; the profit that industrialists retain stems from workers producing beyond what employers truly require to cover the expenses of hiring laborers.

Another situation is exploitation; when employees are paid less than the value of their work. Marx thought that the divide between industrialists and workers would keep expanding. The industrialists would grow richer, while the workers keep descending into poverty.

From the preceding discussion, it can be inferred that the key aspect of the Political economy framework is its focus on the interaction between various classes vying for limited resources within the State, as observed during the Nigerian civil war. The political economy perspective was utilized in this research to examine the issue at hand, highlighting the socio-economic and political alienation experienced by Nigerians during the civil war, which resulted in poverty, unrest, and ultimately, social actions leading to an economic crisis and political instability in the nation. Consequently, the researcher chose the Political Economy approach as the theoretical framework to interpret The Nigerian Civil War and the Economic Crisis in Nigeria based on the aforementioned points. From the above, it can be concluded that Marx was correct in asserting that the "haves" utilize the tools or assets of the State to further oppress, marginalized, and exploit the "have-nots," which exacerbates the Poverty level among the populace.

Conceptual Review

Concept of Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Re-construction

Reintegration is generally defined as the re-acceptance or re-integration of an individual into a community or process, such as that of a migrant back into the society of their country of origin or usual residence (International Organization for Migration, 2017). It is a complex process that necessitates the rebuilding of economic and psychosocial connections. Reintegration is typically seen as a multifaceted process that allows individuals to restore the economic, social, and psychosocial connections essential for sustaining life, securing livelihoods, preserving dignity, and attaining participation in civic life. Consequently, effective reintegration relies on numerous factors including the duration of the migrant's stay abroad, their individual skills and resources; the support from family, friends, and community; as well as the environmental and structural capabilities and the economic and developmental prospects present in the home country. According to UNHCR, 2014; Reintegration generally refers to "the accomplishment of a sustainable return – meaning the capacity of war returnees to establish the political, economic, [legal] and social conditions necessary for sustaining life, livelihood, and dignity" (UNHCR, 2014).

Reintegration is a procedure aimed at eliminating disparities in legal rights and responsibilities between returnees and their fellow citizens, ensuring returnees have equal access to services, productive resources, and opportunities. Such a process presumes that war victims go back to societies that are either stable or nearly stable. In such instances, returnees and communities in return areas ought to access productive assets and social services equally. According to ILO (2021), it is important to highlight that communities in areas of return can gain significantly from returnees, as these individuals can introduce new skills, resources, improved education, health, and gender equality that they may have developed during their time away. In fact, one of the difficulties in reintegration is maintaining the achievements attained in exile when war Victims come back to more conventional social systems. In this context, reintegration may act as a socially transformative process (ILO 2021).

The ultimate goal of reintegration is the overall access to complete political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights for everyone. Reintegration is, thus, a shared obligation guided by the government; certain entities (e.g., UNHCR and additional humanitarian

organizations) take the lead in the initial phases, while other stakeholders (e.g., development agencies) become more significant in the later stages of the reintegration process (UNHCR, 2014). Based on the definitions provided, the aspects of reintegration are:

Legal: Availability of legal avenues; legal assistance for property, land, and housing ownership; Political: Stable governance; complete involvement in political processes; gender parity in all areas of political life; freedom of opinion and expression; protection against persecution; Economic: Access to productive assets (e.g. land, farming inputs, and livestock); and Social: Accessibility to services; security; lack of discrimination; local dispute resolution, etc. (UNHCR, 2014). Reintegration plays a crucial role in returning.

Reintegration support can vary from small, one-time reinstallation grants at the individual level to a variety of economic and social aid measures, which include assistance for the returning community and tailored help for at-risk migrants. Support can be offered directly to the migrants as well as through institutional help at the macro level for the return communities in their home country. Focusing on communities in return countries may require extended, structural, and developmental assistance (International Organization for Migration, 2017). International Organization for Migration, 2017 states that;

Generally, following the act of returning, people initiate the process of readjusting and reintegrating. Much like the return typologies, the literature on the reintegration of forced migrants differs significantly from that of non-forced migrants. Regarding the literature on war victims, reintegration is frequently associated with the 4R's of "repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction" (Lippman and Malik, 2004).

The emphasis of reintegration is therefore on war victims who are returned. In the 1980s, King considered repatriation a type of compulsory return when "the return is not initiated by the migrants themselves but imposed upon them by political situations or authorities, or possibly due to some personal or natural catastrophe" (King 1986, p.5). The UNHCR, nonetheless, emphasizes "voluntary repatriations," interpreting voluntariness as "not just the lack of measures that coerce War Victims to return, but also that he or she should not be obstructed from returning, such as through the spread of misleading information or false assurances of ongoing support" (UNHCR, 1996). Regardless of this definition, it is essential to acknowledge that repatriation can present numerous challenges and might not be a return home or a positive experience (Allen and Morsink, 1994).

Additionally, repatriation frequently happens in substantial waves (like the return of 500,000 wartime victims from Tanzania to Burundi between 2007 and 2009), imposing considerable stress on the home country and agencies attempting to support returnees, which can lead to the understanding that repatriation is frequently a scenario where wartime victims have restricted choices, as they are typically no longer accepted in the country of refuge. While repatriation might not be viewed as an involuntary return, it frequently constitutes a coerced return since the war's victims have no other options available to them (Lippman and Malik, 2006).

Repatriation can present numerous challenges and may not be a true homecoming or a positive experience (Allen and Morsink 1994; Koser and Black 1999; Rogge 1994). Moreover, repatriation typically happens in substantial numbers (like the recent return of 500,000 war victims from Tanzania to Burundi between 2007 and 2009), creating considerable strain on the country of origin and

organizations attempting to aid returnees, which can complicate the experience for both the individuals and the communities they return to (Allen and Morsink, 1994).

The reintegration of returning individuals has primarily concentrated on fulfilling fundamental requirements like obtaining land, housing, nutrition, water, and necessary services. Moreover, reintegration emphasizes broader structural aspects such as safety, legal order, restoring property, fostering reconciliation and peace, and rebuilding livelihoods (Davies 2004). Reintegration therefore transforms into a process that primarily emphasizes rights and balancing the rights of returnees with those of local residents. The United Nations High Commissioner for War Victims (UNHCR) describes reintegration as “linked to the accomplishment of a stable return—in other terms, the capacity of returning War Victims to obtain the political, economic, [legal] and social conditions required.

The literature concerning the reintegration of non-victims of war shares some similarities with the preceding discussion but lacks emphasis on access to essential needs and equal rights. It is likely due to the belief that non-Victims of the war returnees are not in vulnerable situations upon their return and that they possess sufficient resources to independently fulfill their needs (Koser and Black 1999). This assumption is not always accurate, as deportees, denied asylum seekers, and low-skilled migrants may all return in vulnerable situations where they require assistance to fulfill their basic needs and fight for equal access to rights. This will be demonstrated later in this book with the case of domestic workers returning from the Middle East who have undergone disrupted migration cycles and come back without any resources (Michael Gould 2018).

Generally, non-war victim returns can be further classified into these categories: voluntary highly skilled returns, voluntary low-skilled returns, seasonal migrant returns, student returns (either forced or voluntary), returns of rejected asylum seekers, assisted voluntary returns, forced deportations, and returns of second-generation individuals. The process of reintegration varies significantly among these categories. Christou (2006) employs the term “adjustment” for second-generation returns, as she accurately emphasizes that they have not actually “returned” in any sense. For all returnees, the experience is one of “adaptation.” For a confirmed return, reintegration can be described as the “process by which a returning migrant engages in the social, cultural, economic, and political aspects of life in their country of origin” (Cassarino 2008).

Methodology

Data for this research was gathered and sourced primarily from secondary materials like journals, online libraries, research publications, published articles, conference papers, and panel reports, and analyzed through qualitative data analysis techniques. This indicates that the research employs qualitative techniques for data gathering and analysis.

Data presentation and Discussions

Re-integration, Rehabilitation and Re-construction in post Nigeria-Biafra war in South East Nigeria

The world was captivated by the Nigerian Civil War. The conflict occurred in Biafra, the secessionist area in southeastern Nigeria, from July 6, 1967, to January 15, 1970. It marked the initial contemporary civil war in sub-Saharan Africa following independence and was among the most brutal. Approximately 1 to 3 million individuals perished, primarily due to famine, triggering a significant humanitarian disaster. The rates of hunger in Biafra were three times greater than those documented during World War II in

Stalingrad and Holland. Food blockades resulting from the war resulted in critical protein deficits in the secessionist area, leading to widespread malnutrition and suffering among both adults and children. The Biafra conflict stands out as one of the significant nutritional catastrophes of contemporary history. Being among the earliest tragedies after World War II, Biafra captured significant attention from global religious and political figures and received considerable media coverage worldwide. It was the inaugural African war to be broadcasted on television, and numerous viewers worldwide saw the extensive destruction that followed in the conflict-ridden area.

Many had not witnessed a malnourished child in vivid Technicolor, resembling a matchstick, with a distended belly and the reddish-brown hair indicating a gradual demise from hunger” (Waters, 2005, p.697). The Biafran conflict prompted the emergence of the global humanitarian movement, leading to the establishment of several key relief organizations, such as Doctors without Borders, to address the war's consequences. Nevertheless, aid initiatives during the conflict were constrained by the food blockades enforced by the nation's military government.

Reintegration is commonly seen as a multifaceted process that allows individuals to restore the economic, social, and psychosocial connections necessary for sustaining life, livelihood, and dignity while attaining participation in civic life (International Organisation for Migration, 2019). The concepts of return and reintegration are closely connected to sustainability. Though no universally accepted definition of sustainable reintegration exists, the International Organization for Migration (2017) characterizes sustainable reintegration within its comprehensive framework as:

Reintegration is deemed sustainable when returnees achieve economic self-sufficiency, social stability in their communities, and psychosocial well-being that enable them to manage (re)migration influences. Once sustainable reintegration is accomplished, returnees can make future migration choices based on preference, not obligation. The rhetoric of post-war reconciliation faced another setback with the implementation of the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Decree No. 46 of 1970, which barred senior Igbo civil servants and public corporation staff from being reinstated due to allegations of their complicity in supporting Biafra's war efforts. As expected, numerous high-ranking civil servants of Igbo descent were regularly dismissed or forced into retirement from the military, corrections, and law enforcement. This scenario was fundamentally distinct from what had been assured, yet the reasoning behind the government's action was to incentivize the ethnic groups that stayed in the federation after Biafra's separation, and not to appear to be rewarding those who had rebelled against the state. The destiny of Igbo ethnic army officers was harsher, as they were gathered and later subjected to a military tribunal, with some being dismissed without benefits for their involvement in the secession while others were released with full benefits. A few officers stayed in custody, while others were reintegrated and assigned.

The 1972 initiative, which assessed the ownership dynamics and oversight of Nigerian businesses, mandated that foreign firms divest a portion of their shares to Nigerians at a moment when the Igbo had just started to heal from the war's impact and were still viewed as economically weakened—concluded this series of harmful and divisive regulations.

The imbalanced structural relationship between the Igbo East Central States and other states in the federation was exacerbated by the new national revenue-sharing formula implemented after the war. The alteration of the Distributive Pool Account (DPA) in 1970

resulted in the restructuring of “distributive imperatives,” by which fifty percent of the DPA assets were equally divided among states. The remaining fifty percent was allocated according to population to areas that had been divided into additional states, while the demand for more states by the Igbo did not produce significant outcomes.

The Igbo ethnic group widely believed that the formation of just two Igbo states during the 1976 state-creation exercise, in contrast to the establishment of five states in both the Hausa/Fulani (Northern) and Yoruba (Western) regions, placed the Igbo at a significant disadvantage in vying for socioeconomic and political opportunities within the federation. The postwar discourse of reconciliation largely succeeded in establishing a degree of peace and stability, but also offered a shield for the advancement and entrenchment of the “victor’s” interests.

Obstacles to Re-integration, Rehabilitation and Re-construction in post Nigeria-Biafra war in South East Nigeria

The Nigeria-Biafra War predicted numerous destructive conflicts that would jeopardize the existence of many postcolonial African nations. To this day, it continues to prompt inquiries regarding the intricate difficulties surrounding Re-integration, Rehabilitation, and Re-construction in post Nigeria-Biafra conflict in South East Nigeria. Strengthening post-war reconciliation and establishing lasting peace is particularly difficult in African settings where the processes of state and nation-building are still highly debated and ongoing efforts. This consistently carries significant repercussions for enduring post-conflict peace, reconciliation, and resolution, as well as their effects on recipients in particular situations.

The literature regarding the Nigeria-Biafra War often hinders a wider comprehension of the conflict, which is widely seen as the first significant war in independent Africa, and the sole Cold War secessionist crisis that was “discussed seriously concerning the substantive interpretation of self-determination.” It was the sole secessionist conflict during the Cold War that challenged the implementation, essence, and boundaries of the right to self-determination, along with the uncertain and disputed nature of sovereignty in postcolonial Africa. The last fifteen years have seen a continuous stream of writings about recollections of the Nigeria-Biafra War.

Predominant analytical approaches focus on the division of the conflict along ethnic, regional, and religious lines of “us” versus “them,” while alternative perspectives emphasize the rigid stances on key issues of self-determination and national unity. A surge of “top-down” literature exists from significant figures and generals involved in the war, offering deeply personal narratives, along with contributions from other authors who were either actively engaged or indirectly involved in the conflict. The conditions of post-conflict societies indicate that there is no fixed plan for Re-integration, Rehabilitation, and Re-construction following the Nigeria-Biafra war in South East Nigeria.

By the time Nigeria achieved independence in 1960, the conditions had already been established for the nation-state project to face a series of destabilizing crises, starting with emergency rule in the Western Region in 1962, the census crisis of 1962–63, and the electoral crisis of 1964–65. The military's intervention on January 15, 1966 (seen as a coup led by the Igbo/East) and the subsequent counter-coup (viewed as a Hausa-Fulani/North-led response) that occurred six months later on July 29, 1966, essentially signified the conclusion of Nigeria's First Republic and the failure of its federal experiment. The ongoing power conflict among the leading ethnic groups expanded in scale when it was unable to achieve a lasting

solution to the crisis. After multiple unsuccessful negotiations, the disputes and distinctions between General Yakubu Gowon (Nigeria's military leader) and Colonel Chukwuemeka Ojukwu (the military governor of Nigeria's Eastern Region) regarding Nigeria's future and the political framework to implement caused the halt of a systematic engagement process.

The federal government forfeited its control over the Eastern Region, which broke away from the main federation, proclaiming its independence as the Republic of Biafra on May 30, 1967. The Nigerian government reacted to the secession with military action on July 6, 1967, and the resulting conflict concluded with Biafra's defeat and surrender in January 1970. The resolution of the Nigeria-Biafra War was characterized by the generous declaration of “no victor, no vanquished” by the Federal Military Government (FMG) under General Yakubu Gowon. This was broadly embraced and promptly succeeded by the approach of “Reconciliation, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction (3Rs)” for the war's victims. In a nationwide broadcast, named “The Dawn of National Reconciliation,” Gowon announced that the process of reconciliation had genuinely begun.

The severe terms of surrender anticipated from the FMG did not occur; instead, this time was characterized by the generosity of the FMG in statements that assured the personal safety and protection of the Igbo and their assets, the freedom to live and work throughout Nigeria, the reintegration of civil/public servants of Igbo descent into the civil service and military, as well as the provision of general amnesty to the Igbo. John de St. Jorre, noting the conflict as “The Brothers’ War,” contends it was likely the sole armed conflict of such scale in history, carried out with immense cruelty and hostility, devoid of reprisals, trials, or executions. It slowly became clear that there were certainly those who appeared as “winners” and others who were genuinely “defeated.”

The context of institutional and structural factors contributing to Igbo marginalization and alienation is evidenced by later developments and events in post-war Nigeria, highlighting this aspect. Following three months of conflict in 1967, Biafra had lost two-thirds of its land, and its capital, Enugu, was pillaged in the fourth month. This resulted in the war coming to Biafra, turning the area into a large refugee camp. In 1968, the federal government created the National Rehabilitation Commission (NRC) with the main responsibility of organizing post-war food aid initiatives, compensating individuals whose properties were harmed or destroyed by the war, aiding and resettling displaced populations, and executing reconstruction efforts. Nonetheless, these policies were never truly enacted in the post-war period, prompting the inquiry of whether the Gowon administration was genuinely dedicated to authentic reconciliation.

The economic effects of the Nigerian/Biafra Civil War

In Nigeria, the coups d'état of 1966 and the civil war from 1967 to 1970 significantly influenced economic activities, which were also impacted by economic factors. In this research, the political variable will primarily be regarded as independent, while the economic variable will be seen as dependent, even though post-independence trends from 1960 showed that political and economic disintegration mutually supported one another. The Nigerian civil war caused numerous economic challenges for the nation. It resulted in numerous economic hardships and refusals for individuals. The conflict drained significant resources from the Nigerian government; they acquired arms and suffered substantial personnel losses during the war. Even within the Biafran camp, many resources were squandered in their fight. Several thinkers and

creative individuals passed away. The Onitsha publishing scene that thrived prior to the war became fragmented, with some of their books and materials being destroyed by fire. The markets and various other facets of life in those cities were impaired.

The inhabitants of the former Biafra lost numerous cities due to aerial attacks; they were also severed from the nation's economic endeavors. Subsequently, they received a payment of 20 pounds for their financial recovery. These caused them to miss many opportunities. Numerous individuals lost their assets to the locals, rendering them financially ruined at that time. Numerous breadwinners perished during this thirty-month conflict, leaving their dependents caught in the line of fire. It resulted in countless homeless and vulnerable children nationwide. All of these imposed a financial strain on the nation.

The rebuilding of war-impacted regions required significant resources from Nigeria and led the population to engage in various sectors across the nation. The funds allocated to those areas could be redirected to enhance the country's economic growth. The resources invested in this conflict were so immense that had it not been for the war, Nigeria might have adhered to its established policies; however, following the war, new developments started to emerge.

Regarding the young people, a significant number experienced trauma as a result of the conflict. Those individuals could have been productively working and thriving in the nation. All of these had specific economic consequences and caused the country to experience certain setbacks. The conflict created distrust and a degree of division within the nation.

During the war, individuals residing in the areas controlled by Biafra were not attending school, which caused delays for many young people as some became sidetracked and pursued different paths instead of continuing their education. Those who lost their primary earners during the war were now forced to become providers. This resulted in numerous low-paying jobs, heightened the migration from rural to urban areas within the nation, and exerted pressure on cities nationwide. Certain cities grew overcrowded due to the influx of individuals into them. This resulted in certain criminal behaviors since some individuals who arrived in these cities lacked skills and were ill-equipped to handle the challenges present in these unfamiliar settings. As a result, there was an increase in slums, impoverished areas, and makeshift homes being constructed in major urban centers across Nigeria.

Conclusion

Insights from the Nigeria-Biafra conflict and other intra-African disputes indicate that principles of rehabilitation, reconciliation, and reconstruction can lead towards a shared future. Regrettably, the Nigerian situation demonstrates that it's impossible to enforce a singular interpretation of history or a uniform definition of identity on the entire nation. Neo-Biafran organizations have utilized visuals, symbols, and narratives from history along with a specific interpretation of Igbo heritage as tools to support their assertion for self-determination. This has included the use of memorials, anniversaries, flags, and Biafran artifacts to express different representations of Igbo identity and to assert a distinct cultural space that exists prior to the Nigerian state.

Recommendations

From the information provided, the subsequent suggestions are proposed:

1. There is a pressing requirement for swift and efficient re-integration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction of all

individuals impacted during the aftermath of the Nigeria-Biafra conflict in South East Nigeria.

2. There is a continued necessity to maintain poverty alleviation strategies in post-conflict regions, particularly regarding job creation.
3. Following that, opportunities for skill acquisition must be offered to involve the trainee in tasks. Resources should be allocated to assist trainees in establishing small and medium-sized enterprises.
4. An institutional framework is necessary to oversee advancements in policy execution. This will improve alterations needed for successful policy execution.
5. Similarly, it is essential for government to provide essential resources that can enhance individuals' well-being, productivity, and elevate their income levels. These inputs may include fertilizers, agricultural machinery, seeds, training initiatives, skill development programs, credit options, and more.

References

1. Allen U. and Morsink O. (1994) *Sovereignty & Nationalism* (Ohio University Press, 1994)
2. Benjamin O. N. (2015), "The Igbos in the Context of Modern Politics and Government in Nigeria: A Call for Self-Examination and Self-Correction" (presentation, Ahiajoku Lecture Series, Multi-Purpose Hall, Owerri, Imo State)
3. Bergsten, C.F. (2019), 'Needed'. A Global Response to the Global Economic and Financial Crisis, [http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/print.cfm? doc pub & Research](http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/print.cfm?docpub&Research)
4. Bhagwati, J.N. (2020), "Lessons from the East Asian Experience: Opening Address", Rosengran, E.S. and J.S. Jordan (eds.). *Building an Infrastructure for Financial Stability*. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Conference Series No. 44:19-29.
5. Billy J. Dudley, (1973) *Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973).
6. Boutros Boutros-Ghali (2022) *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on January 31, 1992, United Nations, 2022
7. Central Bank of Nigeria (2025), 'Annual Report and Statement of Accounts'. Year Ended 31 December, 2017. Abuja, Nigeria: CBN.
8. David B. (2016) "On Good Terms: Clarifying Reconciliation," Bergh of Report No. 14 (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2016), 11.
9. David B. (2023), "Reconciliation: An Introduction," in *Reconciliation after a Violent Conflict: A Handbook*, eds. David Bloomfield, Teresa Barnes, Stef Vandeginste, and Brandon Hamber (Stockholm: IDEA, 2023), 12.11.
10. Devon C. (2022) "The Contested Politics of Peacebuilding in Africa," in *Peacebuilding, Power and Politics in Africa*, eds. Devon Curtis and Gwinyayi Dzinesa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2022),
11. Diana F. (2024), *People, Peace, and Power: Conflict Transformation in Action* (London: Pluto Press, 2024).
12. Fosu, A.K. (2019), 'Impacts of Policy Syndromes and Governance on Productivity and Growth of African

Economies'. Paper prepared for presentation at the Spring Conference, Oxford University, 22 – 24 March 2009.

13. ILO (2021)
14. International Organization for Migration, 2017
15. James M, (1972) "Sovereignty, Nationalism and Self-Determination," *Political Studies* 47, no. 3 (1999): 482. 3. Charles R. Nixon, "Self-Determination: The Nigeria/Biafra Case," *World Politics* 24, no. 4 (1972): 473–97.4.
16. Lerche C. (2000) "Peacebuilding through Reconciliation," *International Journal of Peace Studies* 5, no. 2 (2000): 1–9.10.
17. Michael G. (2012): *The Biafran War: The Struggle for Modern Nigeria* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012);
18. National Bureau of Statistics (2020)
19. Nwaude, W.A. (2009), *Africa and the Global Economic Crisis: A Risk Assessment and Action Guide*. Paper Prepared for the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University
20. O'Neill, Tom (2007), "Curse of the Black Gold: Hope and Betrayal on the Niger Delta", <http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/pint/2007/02/nigerian-oil/oneill-text> [downloaded 20-7-2009].
21. Okwudiba N. (2000) *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 2018).17. Federal Ministry
22. Patricia D. (2008): *Gender and Genocide in Burundi: The Search for Spaces of Peace in the Great Lakes Region* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008);
23. Paul Obi-Ani, (1998) *Post-Civil War Social and Economic Reconstruction of Igboland: 1970–1983* (Enugu: Milkon Press, 1998)
24. Pleskovic (eds.), (2024) *Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics (ABCDE)*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 21 – 66.
25. Reedy, Y.V. (2019), *India and the Global Financial Crisis: Managing Money and Finance*. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan Strate for Global Intelligence (2009), *The Financial Crisis in Nigeria*, <http://us.mc333.mail.yahoo.com/mc/showMessage?sMid=230&filterBy=&midIn>
26. Sanam N. A. (2007) *Women Building Peace: What They Do, Why It Matters* (Boulder: Rienner, 2007);
27. UNHCR, 2024
28. Velde, D.W., et. al. (2019), 'The Global Financial Crisis and Developing Countries: Synthesis of the findings of 10 country case studies'. ODI Working Paper 306