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State Fragility and Terrorism in Nigeria: A Study of Boko Haram in North East Nigeria

Joel Amobichukwu Nwobodo[1*] & Fidelis Allen[2]

Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria

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Corresponding author:

Joel Amobichukwu Nwobodo

Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria

Abstract

In this study, the unending fragility of the Nigerian state and rising terrorism, especially from the Boko Haram sect, were explored. In fact, over the years, the Nigerian state has been alleged to be fragile, hence the escalation of insecurity, crime, conflicts and even acts of terrorism by Boko Haram against and within the Nigerian state. Despite these efforts, the level of insecurity in the country is still high, and confirmation of this is the continual loss of life of thousands of Nigerians by the extremist Boko Haram group. Despite the plethora of security measures taken to address the daunting challenges of insecurity in Nigeria, government efforts have not produced the desired positive result. It is pertinent, therefore, to look into the challenges that are affecting the fight against insecurity. The study adopted the structural functionalism theory with which it sought to explain State failure, underdevelopment and insecurity in Nigeria. From the foregoing, the study discovered that the presence of insecurity in any environment constitutes a threat to lives and property, hinders business activities, and discourages local and foreign investors, all of which stifle and retards socio-economic development of a country. It is based on this discovery that the study recommends that the Government must be proactive in dealing with security issues and threats through modern methods of intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing, training, logistics, motivation, and deploying advanced technology in managing security challenges.

Keywords: State, Fragility, Terrorism, Boko Haram, Poverty

Introduction

Over the years, the Nigerian state has been alleged to be fragile, hence the escalation of insecurity, crime, conflicts and even acts of terrorism against and within the Nigerian state. Nigeria, like every other nation-state, exists to perform specific functions such as delivering public goods, maintaining law and order, ensuring a peaceful atmosphere, protecting lives and property, and many more. Also, Nation-states exist to satisfy the demands of the citizens living within their sphere. They organise and channel the interests of their people, often but not exclusively in furtherance of national goals and values. They buffer or manipulate external forces and influences, champion the local or particular concerns of their adherents, and mediate between the constraints and challenges of the international (Sampson, & Onuoha, 2011).

There is a hierarchy to the functions states must perform. None is as critical as the supply of security, especially human security. Individuals alone, almost exclusively in special or particular circumstances, can attempt to secure themselves. Or groups of individuals can band together to organise and purchase goods or services that maximise their sense of security. Traditionally, and usually, however, individuals and groups cannot easily or effectively substitute private security for the full spectrum of public security (Tambuwal, 2013). The state's prime function is to provide that political good of security to prevent cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure; to prevent crime and any related dangers to domestic human security; and to enable citizens to resolve their disputes with the state and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion.

The delivery of a range of other desirable political goods becomes possible when a reasonable measure of security has been sustained. Modern states provide predictable, recognizable, systematized methods of adjudicating disputes and regulating both the norms and the prevailing mores of a particular society or polity. The essence of that political good usually implies codes and procedures that together constitute an enforceable rule of law, security of property and inviolable contracts, a judicial system, and a set of values that legitimize and validate the local version of fair play. Another key political good enables citizens to participate freely, openly, and fully in politics and the political process. This good encompasses the essential freedoms: the right to compete for office; respect and support for national and regional political institutions, like legislatures and courts; tolerance of dissent and difference; and fundamental civil and human rights. However, when states fail to deliver the most essentials of public goods, depending on their level of performance, they are classified as weak, failed or collapsed states (Udoh, 2015).

The weakness of the Nigerian state makes it unable to function effectively and to ensure order within its sphere and provide the conditions necessary for economic growth (Marenin, 1995). The growing level of insecurity in the country and the ever-rising crisis of poverty have shown that the state has failed in its most essential responsibilities, which are to protect the lives and property of the citizens. Terrorist groups, such as the Boko Haram sect, the Fulani Herdsmen and the Niger Delta militants, have continually terrorised citizens, and their activities have led to loss of lives and property. Nigerians now live in fear due to the prevalence of kidnappings, armed robbery attacks, bombings and shootings in various parts of the country. Travelling from one state to another has become such a nightmare. This may have precipitated the recent actions of certain groups who have taken to the streets calling for a revolution or a break from the coalition called Nigeria (Olu-lu, and Jegede, 2014).

From the foregoing, the Nigerian state is in crisis, shambles and continual degradation. This crisis is a crisis of the state. It is a central problem of Nigerian society. In other words, the problems of the Nigerian state are a fallout of this crisis. This crisis has eaten deep into the social, political, economic and cultural fabric of the country. Such that there is a high level of illiteracy, technological backwardness, external dependence, mounting foreign debts, obnoxious economic policies, increasing crime rates, cultural degradation, state repression, corruption, violence, open starvation, degrading health and educational facilities, foreign intellectual domination, dysfunctional civil service, rentier economy, ethno-religious conflicts, massive unemployment (Omede, and Omede, 2015), armed robbery, kidnappers and terrorist groups.

According to the 2012 Failed States Index, of the United States think tank Fund for Peace, Nigeria is a potential failed state along with countries such as Haiti, Iraq, Guinea-Bissau, Pakistan, etc. (Okeshola, 2013). Failed states are states that can no longer perform basic functions, such as education, security, or governance; this is usually due to fractious violence or extreme poverty (Okeshola, 2013). The increasing rate of crime, violence, poverty, strikes and massive rural- urban migration in the country between 2011 and 2018, points to the fact that Nigeria is a fragile state. However, Nigeria is not yet a failed state, but the crisis must be urgently arrested.

It is within this context we attempt to study the fragility of the Nigerian state, its causes and its implication for development. There is a need to seek to address the question if state fragility is a product or cause of underdevelopment. This paper therefore intends to study how the inefficiency and fragility of state institutions has affected security and development in Nigeria especially from the Boko Haram perspective.

Statement of the Problem

According to Omoyibo and Akpomera (2023), security is a concept that is prior to the state, and the state exists in order to provide that concept. Security is the prime responsibility of the state (Thomas Hobbes, 1996). The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria specifically states that "The security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government". Unfortunately, the government, on this constitutional responsibility, has failed to provide a secure and safe environment for lives, property, and the conduct of business and economic activities.

The alarming level of insecurity in Nigeria has fuelled the crime rate and terrorist attacks in different parts of the country, leaving unpalatable consequences for the nation's economy and its growth. To address the threat to national security and combat the increasing waves of crime the federal government continually made huge allocations to security (Ewetan, 2013). For instance, in the 2015 budget, N934billion was allocated for the security sector, which was the highest for the year. The figures for 2011, and 2012 were N920billion and N924 billion respectively, while N923billion each was allocated to the sector in 2013 and 2014 (Olufemi, 2015). Despite these efforts, the level of insecurity in the country is still high, and a confirmation of this is the continual loss of lives of thousands of Nigerians by the extremist Boko Haram group. Despite the plethora of security measures taken to address the daunting challenges of insecurity in Nigeria, government efforts have not produced the desired positive result. It is pertinent therefore to look into the challenges that are affecting the fight against insecurity.

Amidst the deteriorating security situation in the country, Nigeria is also confronted with daunting developmental challenges which pose a serious threat to socio-economic development. These developmental challenges include endemic rural and urban poverty, high rate of unemployment, debilitating youth unemployment, low industrial output, unstable and deteriorating exchange rate, high inflation rate, inadequate physical and social infrastructure, very large domestic debt, and rising stock of external debt (Ewetan, 2013).

According to the National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria's unemployment rate increased to 23.9 percent in 2011 compared with 21.1 per cent in 2010 and 19.7 per cent in 2009. The country has a youth population of 80 million, representing about 60 per cent of the total population with a growth rate of 2.6 per cent per year, and the national demography suggests that the youth population remains vibrant with an average annual entrant to the labour force of 1.8 million between 2006 and 2011. In 2011, 37.7 per cent of Nigerians were aged 15-24 years and 22.4 per cent of those between ages 25 and 44 were willing to work but did not get jobs. The United Nations Children Fund reports that every day, Nigeria loses about 2,300 under-five-year-olds and 145 women of childbearing age, making the country the second largest contributor to the under-five and maternal mortality rates in the world. A greater proportion of the population does not have access to water, health care facilities, electricity and affordable, quality education. These indices show that Nigeria is poor, with over 80 million of its population living in extreme poverty. Thus, one of the major concerns of this research is to discover if insecurity is a product of Nigeria's sluggish and ineffective stance towards the challenge or a cause of it.

Key Objectives

The key objectives of this study are to:

1. Examine the emergence of Boko Haram and its impact on state fragility
2. Analyse the role of structural functionalism, fragile state, I nsecurity and underdevelopment in Nigeria

Theoretical Framework

Research reveals that Structural functionalism is one of the classical or traditional theories in the social sciences which can be adopted to explain State failure, underdevelopment and insecurity, especially from the Boko Haram sect. Its origin can be traced to August Comte (1798-1857), while scholars such as Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) and Robert Merton (1920-2003) contributed to its development. The theory was later refined by Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) and Talcott Parson (1902-1979).

> Central to this paradigm is that within human society, the following structures exist: political, economy, religion, education, industry, technology, social control or social order and work together in an interrelated and interdependent manner to promote solidarity and stability.

Hence, any flux in one part of the society causes flux in another part. Again, emphasis here is placed on structures and functions i.e., structures as enumerated above have functions to play to ensure the relative stability of the State, failure of which will ensure that the State remains insecure, undeveloped and fragile.

Historically, functionalists compare society with a living organism and draw analogies between them. Just like a living organism whose parts work together for its survival, society in the same manner has various parts which enable it to meet its needs towards survival. These parts are regarded as social institutions, which are strongly related to the structures mentioned above and they perform specific roles towards maintaining the whole. These roles could be manifest and latent and they have continued to hold the society together (Merton, 1938).

However, Merton (1920-2003) one of the protagonists of functionalism tends to disagree with the idea that every part of the whole performs positive roles towards the maintenance of the system. (Merton, 1938) argues further that:

> The usefulness of analysis should advance from the postulation that any part of the society may be useful, dysfunctional or nonfunctional for groups, society and persons (Haralambos et al., 2008).

State fragility

Poverty is a key characteristic of fragile and failing states in the developing world. Poverty is not a natural condition. There is no nation in the world that has not been poor, but some have been able to 'march' out of their poverty status, while others are still trapped in it. Nigeria is an example of such countries. Nigeria has been categorized as one of the poorest nations in the world today, with over 80 million of its population living in extreme poverty. Our concern emerges from the fact that there are conditions that have made some countries stuck within the poverty trap while others are matching out of it. One of such conditions is the concept of state fragility. According to (Oputeh, 2015) the concept of a 'fragile state'

> was introduced by foreign policy analysts in the early 1990s, in the context of the post-Cold War, when scholars sought to describe the alarming proliferation of civil conflicts that engendered, in some countries, the fragmentation of state institutions, economic recession and deterioration of security conditions.

The global interest in the fragile state issue partly results from substantial research grants awarded by the US and British governments in the early 2000s. The influence of these two governments on the normative work of international organizations such as the OECD and the World Bank has also been a powerful factor in the development of the literature on state fragility (Bouchet, 2011). Another factor is the plasticity of the notions, which enables them to be appropriated in very different ways by policymakers and analysts. Most studies acknowledge the absence of any universally accepted criteria for objectively defining a fragile state (Brinkerhoff, 2007; Cammack et al., 2006; Stewart and Brown, 2009). Although experts in government institutions, consultants and policy analysts, as well as independent think tanks, have produced a large number of case studies, typologies and highly sophisticated indexes to measure the fragility of states, their analytical models have led to a proliferation of definitions, assumptions and criteria.

The notion of fragility has been particularly obscure. Most models seek to combine different dimensions of fragility. Brinkerhoff (2007) distinguishes three: security, effectiveness and legitimacy. Stewart and Brown (2009) identify state failure in authority, service delivery and legitimacy. Most often, the models also take into account the extent of unrest and violence. This is in order to analytically distinguish between situations where state disintegration and collapse eliminate any possibility of collective regulation, and situations where the government faces potential internal and external threats yet still maintains some legitimacy and/or institutional capacity. The literature on fragile states seeks to identify specific traits that characterize countries where the state is unable or unwilling to carry out core functions and roles associated with the Weberian state model. It deals with a continuum of situations where states do not respond to the challenges of security and governance within their national boundaries.

The literature is eclectic and uneven. It addresses a wide variety of questions associated with the legitimacy of state institutions, their authority over national territory and their capacity to deliver basic services to the population in times of political and economic crisis. Many prominent studies tacitly assume that there is a link between security and development, both for the so-called fragile countries and for neighbouring countries and Western democracies (Omede, 2015). They also assume that a functioning and legitimate state is a pre requisite for re-establishing peace and security, economic development, and social order (Adagba, Ugwu, & Eme, 2012), as well as for democratic development (Omede, 2015).

Beyond these commonalities, the literature can roughly be divided into two groups of approaches. (The two are often combined.) On the one hand, some studies concentrate on institutional settings and functions that are assumed to be instrumental for stabilizing society. They focus on institutional arrangements that are necessary to achieve policy results. They pay particular attention to the state's capacity to promote development, provide national security and contribute to international stability. Their research agenda is policy-oriented: it is primarily responding to the donor community's desire for improved aid effectiveness and security responses within poor and unstable contexts. For instance, most indexes and definitions provided by development aid organizations - such as the World Bank, OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), US Agency for International Development (USAID), UK Department for International Development (DfID) - have helped shape this perspective (Adebayo, 2013b).

On the other hand, other approaches concentrate on causal factors leading to the destabilization, fragmentation, decay and breakdown of state institutions. They focus on the range of political, economic, social and environmental determinants leading to state fragility and, to a lesser extent, on the latter's impact on poverty and threats to security. They suggest a number of key elements liable to erode the capacity, authority and legitimacy of state institutions. Some factors may be internal to the political structure (e.g. poor bureaucratic performance, autocratic leadership, corrupt elites); others are associated with major challenges facing the society (e.g. civil conflicts, poverty traps, social inequalities, criminal activities). Other factors are either external (e.g. war, foreign interference, economic shock, environmental degradation) or involve historical legacies (e.g. colonial abuse, Cold War). Most studies seek to combine different clusters of factors (Lewis, 2002).

Flowing from the above, the concept of the fragile state depicts countries where the legitimacy, authority and capacity of state institutions are dramatically declining, weak or broken.

> Fragile states are distressed states that generally lack the capacity to discharge their responsibilities and drive development forward (Okeshola, 2013).

To Oputeh, (2015), fragile states are weak, vulnerable, unstable, insecure, in crisis, collapsed, fragmented, suspended, broken, shadow, and as quasi- and warlord states, stating that each concept refers to a specific situation. The use of the concept is relative. It describes the nature and character of the state in specific countries, which may defer according to the prevailing conditions present in such countries.

Methodology

Research Design refers to the structure of an enquiry: it is a logical matter rather than logistical. Research design is a term used to describe a number of decisions which need to be taken regarding the collection of data before other data are collected for a particular study. In this study, a combination of *historical and descriptive methods* of research will be used as research designs. It is of great importance to identify the method and procedure adopted in this research work, since it gives the reader background information on how to evaluate the findings and conclusion. Historically, the study examined writings in the past concerning State Fragility and Terrorism in Nigeria: a case study of Boko Haram. Descriptively, the study provided answers to the what, why, when, where and how of the subject under review. Therefore the study adopted the qualitative method of data collection and analysis.

Results and Discussion

Emergence of Boko Haram and its impact on state fragility

Boko Haram:

"Jamáá Ahl al-Sunnah Lidda 'awati wal-Jihad" whose name roughly translates as "Western education is forbid-den". History replays itself, in the sense that before Boko Haram activities, there were other forms of terrorism in Nigeria. Terrorism has a long global history and the West African region in particular has experienced one form of terrorism or the other like other countries of the world. Boko Haram activities in Nigeria could be dated back to 1945 in the Plateau region where there have been reoccurrences of different attacks in Jos. This took place when the Igbo communities in Jos clashed with the migrant Hausa in gaining access to the tin mining opportunities (Adagba, Ugwu, & Eme, 2012).

In May 1, 1953, a political riot broke out in the city of Kano between the northerners and the southerners when a member of the Action Group (AG) political party Anthony Enahoro, introduced a private bill of self-government in 1956. This independence bill was supported by members of the NCNC political party in the east. But the northern leaders of the Northern People's Congress and other northern leaders were of the view that the bill of self-government should be considered at a feasible time. The issue of independence brought a political consensus controversy between the political parties in Kano as there was displeasure resulting from the political meeting of the parties. Kano residents then started rioting from 16-19 May, 1953.

When the Action Group and the NCNC political parties led by Chief S.L. Akintola made a tour to Sabon Gari in Kano, an area predominantly occupied by southerners to campaign for self-government which claimed many lives and injured more. The 1966 massacre of the Igbos in northern Nigeria is another form of terrorism that escalated to a civil war from 1967-1970, when the easterners declared the Republic of Biafra (Adebayo, 2013b). Religion which has been a great dividing force in Nigeria caused a riot in 1978 in Kaduna state. This was as a result of the debate on Sharia at the Constituent Assembly.

The Islamic revolution in 1979 by the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) led by their leader Ibrahim Al Zak-Zaky encouraged the Islamic fundamentalist movement that emerged in the 1970s in Zaria and Kaduna the northern part of Nigeria. Al Zak-Zaky preached Islam as an alternative model to socialism and capitalism. The Nigerian constitution was burnt by his group as the protest against secularism and supported Iran's revolution in 1979 (Ibrahim, 1998). Al Zak-Zaky also converted to Shi`a Islam which led to the transformation of Islamic movement for "a second Jihad" to implement Shari`a in Nigeria. Meanwhile, the founder of Boko Haram, Muhammed Yusuf, was a follower of al Zak-Zaky before he became the amir of Jama`at al-Tajdid al-Islami (Movement for the Revival of Islam, JTI) in Borno state (Abimbola, 2010, Part 1).

Tahir (2003) said that the JTI was a faction of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria. The Maitatsine crisis of 1980 is another form of terrorism that took place in Nigeria before the recent terrorist attacks. It was an anti-Islamic sect that opposed certain practices of Islam in Nigeria. This crisis was as a result of different ways of practicing the Islamic religion that preached a strong compulsion to kill any one that does not believe in their way of life which involved many youths in the activities of the sects and harassing the general public in the northern part of Nigeria. The former leader of Boko Haram, Muhammed Yusuf, who was killed by the security agents in 2009 was also a member of the Maitatsine group led by Mohammed Marwa who was also killed in 1980 by the Nigerian security agents in Kano state. The Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau, took over the leadership from Mohammed Yusuf who was killed by the governmental forces.

Furthermore, the killing of the controversial Islamic preacher Mohammed Marwa in Kano state caused increased terrorist activities in 1980 across the northern states in Nigeria. According to Falola (1998, pp. 153) the conflict that ensued between the sect and the police while preaching led to the death of four police men, burning of 13 police vehicles and injuring many people. The Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry (1981) recorded that the crisis claimed the lives of more than 4,179 people and many houses and shops were destroyed.

Boko Haram was founded in 2002, originally opposing western education, and later gained grounds in 2009 to declare Islamic state. The splitting of Boko Haram to Ansaru terrorist group made them to be known as an international terrorist group in 2012. The episode of 2012 of Boko Haram activities was the marriage of different groups of bandits, Boko Haram and the Ansaru terrorist group as they made the region a real war zone and recorded huge destruction of lives and property.

Boko Haram is linked to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Al-Sharia groups in North Africa, the Movement for the Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), the Lord's Resistant Army (LRA) in Central Africa, and Al-Shabaab in East Africa. At the height of Boko Haram activities in 2012, the group pledged allegiance to foreign terrorist groups. This was noted in 2005 during "Operation Sawdust" by Joint Security Forces in Borno, Bauchi and Yobe, where Yusuf Mohammed, the leader of Boko Haram, Ashafa and Bello confessed under interrogation that they were trained in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon (Danjibo, 2009, pp. 69-70).

This group has carried out its cam-paign of attacks of suicide bombings and bloody raids on innocent civilians in social gatherings, government buildings and security agents across the northern part of Nigeria and across borders of the neighbouring countries. Maiduguri is the hub of terrorism in Nigeria but their activities now cut across neighbouring countries and beyond. The Nigerian state has been receiving a lot of challenges from the activities of the terrorists. The activities of Boko Haram have drastically increased the rate of crimes and insecurity which spread across the neighbouring countries and affects socio-economic activities across borders. Since most of the youths in the region have deviated from engaging themselves in reasonable jobs to the hot business of the day, by carrying guns to induce fear in the various countries, Boko Haram terrorist group is killing people indiscriminately across borders. Due to the nature of the Lake Chad Basin, the Sambisa Forest has become an abode for Boko Haram terrorist group.

Sambisa is a forest in Northeastern Nigeria. Sambisa forest is about 60 kilometers (37 mi) with an area of 60,000 square kilometers (23,000 sq mi). Sambisa Forest is the major stronghold of Boko Haram which covers an area worth to be a country. It is located in the Southeast of Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state which is the hub of terrorism in Nigeria. The forest occupies parts of Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Jigawa, Darazo and some parts of Kano state. It has boundaries with the Southwestern part of the Chad Basin National Park, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria.



File Photo: Members of the Boko Haram militant group retrieved +from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/29/nigeria-sambisa-forest-boko-hara-hideout-kidnapped-school-girls-believed-to-be-held

Structuralism functionalism, Fragile State, Insecurity and underdevelopment in Nigeria

Inability to deal with or manage Boko Haram terrorism sect makes the Nigerian state look fragile. Connecting the tenet of functionalism with the major variables of this discourse, insecurity caused by book haram terrorism for instance could be regarded as a sub-unit of the social control institution of human society that affords a section of the society "functional prerequisites" for the survival of its members, to prevent them from extinction. The role discrepancy and obligations of State agencies created to checkmate insecurity could be viewed in the following two ways:

Firstly, violent conflicts that generate insecurity and underdevelopment i.e. armed robbery, assassination, kidnapping, terrorism etc. provide unofficial or illegal employment for those who indulge in them (Global Terrorism Index, 2015; Haralambos et al., 2008; Ngwama, 2014; Oputeh, 2015). These activities enable them to adjust or design innovative means of survival (Merton, 1938) since the rate of unemployment and poverty is too high in contemporary Nigeria.

Secondly, it provides a means of occupation and career development for security personnel in their various agencies in the society.

In Nigeria, there are nine of such agencies. Their roles of maintaining law and order are essential for cohesion and smooth running society (Andersen and Taylor, 2006). The occupational roles of both legitimate and illegitimate employment enable the above classes of persons to perform essential functions in other social institutions such as the family and education which are also germane to the survival of the society.

> The occupation provides a means of livelihood for every member of the family, which prevent members from extinction and also permit the institution of family to also perform other roles of socializing the young, regulating sexual activity and procreation, providing physical, emotional and psychological support to members, assigning identity to people (Glenn, 1987).

It also enables the institution of family to pay the school fees of their children in educational institutions, where different generations

acquire skills for occupational roles in work settings and the progress of the society.

> Furthermore, the occupational roles of the security personnel ensure the functionality of social mobility from the lowest rank to the highest in the social stratification machinery meant to dispense humanity into social positions which they must be inspired to fill in the society (Haralambos et al., 2008).

Therefore, the manifest roles of these agencies are evident in system maintenance within the threshold of employment opportunity for individual members and the safety of the general society while the latent role is the implication of insecurity to the wellbeing of Nigerians and national development. This theory brings to the fore the importance of security as one of the functions of the economy sub-system and social control institution of the Nigerian society and therefore when this fails, the society invariably becomes fragile and underdeveloped.

The Fragility of the Nigerian State

A Nigerian poet, Chinua Achebe wrote that Nigeria "is an example of a country that has fallen down; it has collapsed" (Achebe, 1983:1). Whereas the Nigerian project has continued and has not really collapsed, such views are strengthened by certain problems in the country which reflect a form of state failure. Nigeria typifies a perfect example of a failing and a weak state that is fast gravitating towards a failed or collapsed state like Somalia and others. The existing works on state failure and its groups seem useful in this regard. According to Lawal, and Abe, (2011) "nation-states fail because they can no longer deliver positive political goods to their people", and he listed these political goods to include education, healthcare, security, social infrastructure, employment opportunities, and the legal framework for law and order. As a result of this, the government loses its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. The state is therefore characterized by an intense and enduring violence, which is usually directed against the existing government (Longe, 2016). Nigeria obviously fits into this explicit narrative. Presently, Nigeria is ranked 14th on the Fragile State Index published annually by Foreign Policy (Foreign Policy, 2018). State failure in Nigeria has an unswerving connection with the state's high level of corruption, as Rotberg has rightly argued: "state failure is man-made and not merely accidental" (Longe, 2016).

Nigeria is categorized under the countries called underdeveloped countries, least developed countries (LCD) or developing countries. These countries are characterized by structural distortions, external dependence, low productive capacity, technological backwardness, mass squalor and failing industries (Onimode, 1988). The Nigerian state that exists within this setting has been described by Kholi (2004) as a neo patrimonial state. He describes neo patrimonial states as states where leaders treat public resources as their private property. He argues that it is the existence of this neo patrimonial state that has prevented development in underdeveloped countries. The pursuit of personal and narrow group interests rather than public goals weakens the capacity of the state to perform its traditional functions. He blames the existence of neo patrimonial states on history. The distortions between public and private interest was not well established in some developing countries due to their colonial heritage. The consequence of this lack of distortions is the emergence of distorted states that are weak and bedeviled with structural problems. Furthermore, Marenin (1987) provides that:

> The state in Nigeria lacks autonomy, unity, an organizing technology which could provide either, and the capacity to distinguish and enforce a private-public good distinction.

He argues that the Nigerian state does not have the capacity to reach down and restructure its social base and support coalition and fight insecurity. It is within this context that state fragility emerges. A state that cannot perform the function of providing public goods, providing security, maintaining peace and order within its social formation is a weak institution and is susceptible to eventual collapse. If states are saddled with the responsibility to provide certain public goods for the society, such as law and order, defence, contract enforcement, and infrastructure, the Nigerian state provides very few of these. The state is unable to exercise control over much of its territory. The Nigerian state cannot maintain stability within its sphere as the country is caught up in a series of violence and insecurity (Herbst, 2000). There is an inherent crisis in Nigeria, and this is the crisis of insecurity. This study believes that we succinctly propose that the high level of insecurity in Nigeria is an issue of state fragility.

Conclusion

From the study above, the presence of insecurity in any environment constitutes threat to lives and properties, hinders business activities, and discourages local and foreign investors, all of which stifles and retards socio-economic development of a country. In Nigeria there has been a rising wave of insecurity since the country attained independence in 1960. This rising wave has not abated but has assumed a dangerous dimension which is even threatening the corporate existence of the country as one geographical entity. The elimination of these threats should be the number one goal of the government in Nigeria at all levels as the country cannot achieve any significant development amidst insecurity and violence failure which will lead to Nigeria being regarded as a fragile state.

Recommendations

1. The government must be proactive in dealing with security issues and threats, through modern methods of intelligence gathering, and intelligence sharing, training, logistics, motivation, and deploying advanced technology in managing security challenges.
3. In order to drive development, there is a need to create an economy with relevant social, economic and physical infrastructure for business operations and industrial growth, to provide gainful employment, high level of educational facilities, and medical care for the people.
4. Governments at all levels should ensure that rising poverty indices are reversed and a realistic social security programme is pursued and systematically implemented to ensure that the populace meets their basic needs.

Contribution to knowledge

The article has contributed to knowledge by revealing that the real panacea for solving the insecurity challenge in Nigeria is for the government to accelerate the pace of development by strengthening the institutions of the state to fight terrorism and organised crime.

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